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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-RETENTION OF MENTAL
DEFECTIVE DELINQUENT AFTER EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE.-The re-

lator, Charles Morriale, was sentenced on April 5, 1935 to Sing Sing
prison for a term of six years, having pleaded guilty to a charge of
attempted robbery, third degree. The court recommended that "he
receive hospital treatment for his mental condition," but made no
finding that he was a "mental defective." On May 24, 1935 the
relator was transferred to the Institution for Male Defective Delinquents at Napanoch, New York, as a mental defective, in accordance
with Section 439 of the Correction Law,1 and thereafter, on March
15, 1938, he was transferred to a similar institution at Woodbourne,
New York. A few days before the expiration of his six-year sentence, which expired on January 23, 1941, the respondent, as superintendent of Woodbourne Institution presented to the county judge
a petition for an order authorizing the relator's retention after the
expiration of his sentence, in accordance with Sections 440 and 460
of the Correction Law.2 On January 18, 1941 the county judge
issued an order adjudging the relator to be a mental defective and
directing that he be committed to Woodbourne Institution, "there to
be dealt with according to law." The relator was given no notice
of this petition and was given no opportunity to challenge it. He
seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that such order for his
retention after the expiration of his sentence deprives him of his
liberty without due process of law. Respondent contends that the
relator's constitutional rights are fully protected by Section 446 of
the Correction Law.3 Held, judgment reversed. The relator is
entitled to an order sustaining writ of habeas corpus and directing
his discharge from custody of the respondent, without prejudice to
a new proceeding, providing notice and opportunity to be heard upon
the question of relator's alleged mental defectiveness. People ex rel.
Charles Morriale v. Vernon Branham, as Superintendent of Woodbourne Institution4for Defective Delinquents, 291 N. Y. 312, 52 N. E.
(2d) 881 (1943).
1

N. Y. Laws 1909, c. 47, § 439.

3

Id. § 446. See N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 1230 et seq.

2 Id. § 440.
4A

previous appeal to the Court of Appeals questioning the constitutionality of Section 440 of the Correction Law, was dismissed on the ground that
the case was not one "where the only question involved on the appeal, is the
validity of a statutory provision of the State or of the United States under
the Constitution of the United States." Per curiam, 289 N. Y. 813, 47 N. E.
(2d) 54 (1943).
On Jan. 13, 1944 a reargument was granted by the Court of Appeals, but
the court found no reason to modify its decision, since the question whether a
person detained as insane without a valid judicial determination of insanity
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After the expiration of a prisoner's term his further confinement
is no longer justified unless he be adjudged a mental defective by an
order issued by the court in accordance with Section 440 of the Correction Law. It has been held that such an order imports a judicial
consideration and inquiry. 5 The statute does not require in express
terms that notice and opportunity to be heard be given to the prisoner,
but it is reasonable to imply the legislature's intent that such an
order be made only in accord with due process of law. The validity
of a legislative act must be upheld unless it is void beyond reasonable
doubt. 6 Section 439 of the Correction Law authorizes an administrative order transferring a prisoner during his term of imprisonment
to an institution for defective delinquents, without a prior judicial
finding of the fact of mental defectiveness. In such a case the prisoner's constitutional rights are protected by Section 446 of the Correction Law which authorizes the prisoner, after such transfer to
"seek delivery from custody" by habeas corpus proceedings in which
7
the fact of his mental defectiveness is made material to the inquiry.
Section 446, however, does not apply to a prisoner whose term of
imprisonment has expired. Such a prisoner has the constitutional
right to notice and opportunity to challenge the assertion that he is
a mental defective before a judicial decision is had upon the question.
An ex parte judicial decision that a prisoner, otherwise entitled to
his liberty, shall be confined in an institution for the rest of his life
unless discharged by his custodian, or until he secures his release by
habeds corpus proceedings, is contrary to the tradition of the common
8
law and a violation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The constitutions of almost all the states contain a guaranty of
due process of law similar to that contained in the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Such provisions are usually construed to be identical with those of the Federal
Constitution.9 It has been held that the right to restrain an insane
person is not governed by the general law which states that no one
shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law, since immediate action may be required for the protection of the insane person•
should be discharged without inquiry whether in fact he is insane, was not
presented at Special Term, and could not be considered on appeal. Law Rep.
News, Feb. 25, 1944, decided, Feb. 24, 1944.

5See In matter of Naylor, 284 N. Y. 188, 30 N. E. (2d) 468 (1940).
Finch, J., in discussing Section 440 of the Correction Law, said: "Th; expression, 'such judge, if satisfied', imports a judicial hearing on this issue."
6People ex rel. Henderson v. Board of Supervisors of Westchester County,
147 N. Y. 1, 41 N. E. 563, 30 L. R. A. 74 (1895).
7 People ex rel. Romano v. Thayer, 229 App. Div. 687, 242 N. Y. Supp.
289 (1930); People ex rel. Gaudino v. Superintendent of Institution for Defective Delinquents, Napanoch, 263 App. Div. 1942, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 787 (1942).
8U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV; N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6. Accord, Hovey
v. Elliot, 167 U. S. 409, 17 Sup. Ct. 841, 42 L. ed. 215 (1897) ; People v. George
Henriques & Co., 267 N. Y. 398, 196 N. E. 304 (1935) ; People ex rel. Barone
v. Fox, 202 N. Y. 616, 96 N. E. 1126 (1911).
9See 16 C. J. S. § 568, subd. c.
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and others. 10 All authorities agree that a statute is void which
authorizes a final adjudication of insanity and commitment, without
making some provision by which the person himself be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard.'
J. E. P.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT DOCTRINEEXTRA-TERRITORIAL VALIDITY OF DIvORCEs.-The respondent, Ernest

Davis, and his first wife were married and domiciled in New York.
Several years afterwards, he obtained a divorce in Nevada upon
grounds of extreme cruelty, without having personally served his
spouse. The very day that the decree was granted, he married the
deceased, Anna Holmes, and returned with her to New York. His
first wife then sued for and subsequently obtained in New York, a
divorce on the ground of Davis' adultery with the deceased, New
York not recognizing the Nevada divorce because its court lacked
personal jurisdiction.' The appellant relied upon the New York decree
to prove that the respondent had never been legally married to her
sister, the deceased, because they never remarried after the New
York decree was granted, and therefore were not husband and wife,
but merely two persons living together. As such, Davis would not
be entitled to the letters of administration of the Holmes estate. The
lower court reversed the order of the Niagara County Surrogate,
denying the letters of administration to the respondent. Held,
affirmed. In view of the most recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina,2 the
court gave full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce,3 declaring
that the finding of the New York court was not binding in this proceeding, and stating broadly that the decree of a sister state is not
open to collateral attack by a third party. In re Holnes Estate,
291 N. Y. 261, 52 N. E. (2d) 424 (1943).
10 State of Minn. ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County,
309 U. S. 270, 60 Sup. Ct. 523, 84 L. ed. 744 (1940); Maxwell v. Maxwell,
189 Iowa 7, 177 N. W. 541 (1920).
11 Barry v. Hall, 98 F. (2d) 222, 68 App. D. C. 350 (App. D. C. 1938);
Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 127 S. W. (2d) 410 (1939); Ex parte Allen,
82 Vt. 365, 73 AtI. 1078, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 232 (1909).
'Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 226 N. E. 508 (1920); McGown v.
McGown, 164 N. Y. 558, 58 N. E. 1089 (1900) ; Matter of Kimball, 155 N. Y.
62 (1898); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 N. Y. 30 (1871); Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y.
272 (1869); Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424 (N. Y. 1806). In these cases,
judgments of divorce procured by constructive service were held invalid.
2317 U. S. 287, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942). Petitioners were married to, and
domiciled with, their respective spouses in North Carolina. Together they left
for Nevada, where, after fulfilling the forty-two day residence reqhirement,
they obtained divorces on the ground of cruelty, having served their spouses by
publication and substituted service only. They were then married, returned to
North Carolina, and proceeded to set up housekeeping. The authorities of

